This paper studies in detail about the early years of José Gaos (1900- 1969) and his education in philosophy and literature. Therefore, we know that their studies (academic or not) were not purely “philosophical” in 1915. Literature and philosophy played in Gaos an equally important role. The first real encounter with philosophy happens before he comes to Valencia in 1915; but in this year Gaos also receives a strong education, in aesthetic and literary, through press and philosophical journals, and especially (...) within the group formed with Max Aub, José Medina Echeverría and his brother Carlos Gaos. (shrink)

في كتابه "العلمانية من سالب الدين إلى موجب الدولة: راهنية مشروع بشارة عربيًا"، الصادر عن المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات، يشتغل سهيل الحبيّب على فرضية أن كتاب عزمي بشارة، الدين والعلمانية في سياق تاريخي، هو إضافة نوعية على المستويين المعرفي والنظري إلى ما هو سائد في السياق الفكري والأيديولوجي العربي المعاصر والراهن من فهمٍ نظري للعلمانية، ومن تمثّل تاريخي لظواهرها. ويحاول الاستدلال على صحة هذه الفرضية بتحديد الوجوه المتعيّنة للإضافات المعرفية والنظرية التي يحويها كتاب بشارة، من حيث هو جهد يتتبّع (...) ظواهر التديّن والتَّعَلْمُن على مدار قرون عديدة وفي سياقات عديدة من التاريخ الغربي الحديث والمعاصر والراهن، للوصول إلى الفهم التاريخي لظاهرتَي الدين والعلمانية. (shrink)

The Court of Appeals of Minnesota, in State v. Saunders ), held that the statutory offense of practicing medicine without a license was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a claim involving a farmer who offered a home remedy to cure cancer. The court held that, although Minnesota Statute § 147.081 subd. 3 contains general language and undefined terms, the statute contains sufficient particularity to show ordinary persons what conduct is prohibited, and thereby passes the void-for-vagueness test. The court stated (...) that, according to the statute, while a person holding a license to practice medicine is permitted to engage in a broad range of conduct, those without that license are proscribed from engaging in that same range of conduct.The defendant, Mr. Saunders, a dairy farmer, claimed that he could cure ill people by injecting an ill person's blood into a cow and then feeding that person the cow's colostrum. (shrink)

"First published by Oxford University Press, 1916."--Title page verso.

Maḥmūd, Zakī Najīb; 1905- ; philosophy; criticism and interpretation.

We introduce two extreme methods to pairwisely compare ordered lists of the same length, viz. the comonotonic and the countermonotonic comparison method, and show that these methods are, respectively, related to the copula TM (the minimum operator) and the Ł ukasiewicz copula TL used to join marginal cumulative distribution functions into bivariate cumulative distribution functions. Given a collection of ordered lists of the same length, we generate by means of TM and TL two probabilistic relations QM and QL and identify (...) their type of transitivity. Finally, it is shown that any probabilistic relation with rational elements on a 3-dimensional space of alternatives which possesses one of these types of transitivity, can be generated by three ordered lists and at least one of the two extreme comparison methods. (shrink)

In order to illuminate the similarities and differences between science and theology, we consider an epistemology and methodology for each that can be characterised as a dialectical critical realism. Our approach is deeply indebted to the work of the great Swiss theologian, Karl Barth. Key points are that the object under study determines the method to be used, the community of investigators and the nature of the possible knowledge to be gained; the necessity of a posteriori, rather than a priori (...) reasoning; and that the dialogue between theology and science should account for both the similarities and differences between the two disciplines. The counterintuitive nature of quantum physics is used to illustrate how in science the dialectic element should lead to a critical dimension to realism, and one is forced to engage with reality on its own terms. (shrink)

In two parts this essay studies the subject, the predicate, and their relation by examining their relations in logic and their functioning in language. Strawson unites the two discussions by arguing that the logical relations can be integrated with the linguistic functions by a generalization of the latter.

Price’s chief interest in this study of the Investigations is the origin of speaking. A review of Wittgenstein’s examinations of logic, pictures, rules of use, and mental processes as proposed standards of meaning shows that no determinate standard such as these can explain the origin of speaking. Wittgenstein’s discussions of custom, usage, pain statements, and recognition serve to elucidate the context and origin of speaking. However, the result raises difficulties for comprehending the originative moment of speaking anew. Although these are (...) partially resolved by Wittgenstein’s discussions of imagination and negation, the origin of any speaking must finally remain opaque because of the way ordinary usage contributes to meaning. (shrink)

Multiple groups have interests that intersect within the new field of deep submergence archaeology. These groups‟ differing priorities present challenges for interdisciplinary collaboration, particularly as there are no established guidelines for best practices in such scenarios. Associating the term 'archaeology' with projects directed at underwater cultural heritage that are are not guided by archaeologists poses a real risk to that heritage. Recognizing that the relevant professional organizations, local laws, and conventions currently have little ability to protect pieces of cultural heritage (...) across disciplines and international boundaries, the authors propose institution-specific mechanisms, called Archaeology Review Boards , guided by local and international laws and conventions concerning cultural heritage, as the best means to provide oversight for academically centered archaeological activities at the local level. (shrink)

This paper outlines the demographic characteristics of the Baiga tribe, one of the most primitive of the aboriginal tribal groups of Central India. The Baiga population has grown steadily since the first anthropological study of the tribe in the 1930s. Age at menarche, age at marriage, breast-feeding, and time interval between marriage and first conception are natural. There are more females than males. Sub-tribe endogamy is common; consanguineous marriage is favoured (34% of marriages are between first cousins) and marital distance (...) is low (mean 7·1 km). Though the mean menarcheal age is high (15·2 years), mean age at first marriage is low (16·6 years), giving a long reproductive period. (shrink)

Like the other volumes in this excellent series, so auspiciously inaugurated by Reale’s Metaphysics, this contains a long introduction, a translation, and copious notes. Unlike those in the Clarendon Aristotle series, these translations are designed to be readable rather than to provide an unbiased key to Aristotle’s meaning and admit an element of conscious interpretation.

The Ohio State University Press is to be congratulated, and Lennon and Olscamp are to be thanked for this book. Nicholas Malebranche has always been a major philosopher on the Continent but he has been less well-known in recent times within the English-speaking world. The Search was twice translated into English at the close of the seventeenth century and Malebranche was widely read and commented upon in English in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Locke wrote about Malebranche. David (...) Hume not only cites him, Hume's analysis of causation is thought to owe much to Malebranche's doctrine. Some of Berkeley's earliest critics took him to be a Malebranchist. A. A. Luce argued some years ago that Malebranche is one of the most important philosophical influences upon Berkeley. Accordingly it is a delight to have the full text available and I hope it will be possible to produce a paper-back version. This translation is based on the edition of the Oeuvres complètes de Malebranche under the general editorship of André Robinet. This includes definitive editions of the Recherche and the Éclaircissements edited by Geneviève Rodis-Lewis. (shrink)

One’s first reaction on seeing this book might be to wonder why it is labelled "Aristotle" at all. The de Mundo has long been regarded as spurious, the work of a later Peripatetic, or even of the vaguely Stoicizing eclecticism which was already, in the later Hellenistic period, beginning to see Aristotle and Plato as the proponents of the same philosophy. There has, however, been no general agreement about where precisely in that framework it should be placed, and Reale, who (...) has recently tried, not without success, to rehabilitate Melissus as a serious thinker, now tries to rehabilitate the de Mundo as a genuine work of Aristotle: he thinks the lack of agreement among the critics is itself an argument in its favor. Restoring the original attribution seems to be the main purpose of what is in fact the first full scale edition with commentary of the de Mundo. It contains a text, largely that established by Lorimer, with translation en face, a long introduction, copious notes and a full word index; the text and translation occupy less than a fifth of the whole. As far as a non-Italian can judge the translation is accurate—and free of effusive expansion. The notes are a real mine of information. So it should be said at the start that whether or not one accepts Reale’s thesis about genuineness does not affect the value of the edition as such. The question of authenticity is discussed with great thoroughness in the introduction, with considerable backing, some of it perhaps inevitably repetitious, in the form of detailed discussion in the notes. At the start Reale lists the charges levelled against the work at various times. These are that in general it contains non-Aristotelian elements, that the style is completely different from Aristotle’s, as is the method, being one of assertion rather than demonstration. Further, much of the material in the scientific section is post-Aristotelian, and the "Orphic hymn" of chapter 7 shows Stoic influence. Reale argues that the first three charges will stick only if the basis of discussion is the Aristotle of the treatises and claims that the objectionable material in the de Mundo can be paralleled from the exoteric works. Thus all the pre-Jaeger discussion is misconceived. (shrink)

It is often said to-day that mathematics is nothing but an extension or development of logic; indeed, the identity of logic and pure mathematics is alleged so confidently by persons whose mathematical attainments entitle them to consideration when they talk about the subject-matter of mathematics, as to be in danger of being ranked with the truths that an educated man should accept on the authority of the specialist. Yet a little reflection might at least make one hesitate. For whatever else (...) may be said about logic, it is generally allowed to study thinking. Some would say merely that it studies inference; but inference is thinking. Now the mathematician thinks and infers, but he does not study the activity of thinking and inferring; and a study of that activity would never make the discoveries credited to the mathematicians. (shrink)

It is often said to-day that mathematics is nothing but an extension or development of logic; indeed, the identity of logic and pure mathematics is alleged so confidently by persons whose mathematical attainments entitle them to consideration when they talk about the subject-matter of mathematics, as to be in danger of being ranked with the truths that an educated man should accept on the authority of the specialist. Yet a little reflection might at least make one hesitate. For whatever else (...) may be said about logic, it is generally allowed to study thinking. Some would say merely that it studies inference; but inference is thinking. Now the mathematician thinks and infers, but he does not study the activity of thinking and inferring; and a study of that activity would never make the discoveries credited to the mathematicians. (shrink)

Further, we come here to what for the purpose of our present argument is the most important consideration of all, viz. that if we could show that there were two kinds of neural or physiological processess, occurring respectively on all occasions of pleasure and pain, the fact would be valueless for proving that life must be predominantly pleasant. It is perhaps intelligible that to succeed or fail in purposive activity should bring respectively contentment and discontent rather than vice-versa; but that (...) of two kinds of neural or physiological process, one should be accompanied by pleasure and the other by pain, is no more intelligible than if the connection were reversed. If the behaviour of any creature is affected by desires and aversions, by judgments, by feelings: if its desires and aversions or its judgments are connected with or affected by its pleasures and pains, then indeed the question with what bodily conditions its pleasures and pains are connected is part of the problem that interests the biologist—viz. what the conditions are under which the species can continue. But in that case the biologist must not claim that all the conditons of life and reproduction can be found in what happens in the body. Pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, purposes are not events that happen in the body. If they are the mere “apparence or sense” of what happens there, and alone determines survival or extinction, then what happens there to determine survival might, for all we can see, equally appear as pain or pleasure. (shrink)

Nicolai Hartmann, in an interesting discussion of Aristotle’s account of moral virtue, has called attention to the difference between the contrariety of opposed vices and the contrast of certain virtues. The äκρa or extremes, somewhere between which Aristotle thought that any morally virtuous disposition must lie, are not conciliable. The same man cannot combine or reconcile, in the same action, cowardice and bravery, intemperance and insensibility, stinginess and thriftlessness, passion and lack of spirit. These are pairs of contraries, between which (...) a virtue lies; but the virtue is not a synthesis of the extremes in a pair. (shrink)

Advances in medical technology and information have facilitated clinical practices that favourably affect the success rates of treatment for diseases. Regenerative medicine has been the focus of the recent medical agenda, to the extent of fundamentally changing treatment paradigms. Stem cell practices, their efficacy, and associated ethical concerns have been debated intensively in many countries. Stem cell research is carried out along with the treatment of patients. Thus, various groups affected by the practices inevitably participate in the discussions. In addition (...) to discussions based on avoiding any harm, providing benefits and respecting personal autonomy and justice, problems arise owing to the lack of legal regulations for stem cell research and practice. The dimensions of the problems vary in the developing countries, with widespread use of advanced medical technology but with lack of sources allocated for healthcare, dominance of paternalistic physician–patient relationships and failure to achieve a sufficient level of awareness of patients’ rights. This article discusses the current situation of stem cell practices within the context of regenerative medicine in Turkey and ethical concerns about some of the legal regulations, such as the Regulation for Umblical Cord Blood Banking and Guidelines for Non-embryonic Stem Cell Study for Non-clinical Purposes directing the research on this issue. (shrink)

Further, we come here to what for the purpose of our present argument is the most important consideration of all, viz. that if we could show that there were two kinds of neural or physiological processess, occurring respectively on all occasions of pleasure and pain, the fact would be valueless for proving that life must be predominantly pleasant. It is perhaps intelligible that to succeed or fail in purposive activity should bring respectively contentment and discontent rather than vice-versa; but that (...) of two kinds of neural or physiological process, one should be accompanied by pleasure and the other by pain, is no more intelligible than if the connection were reversed. If the behaviour of any creature is affected by desires and aversions, by judgments, by feelings: if its desires and aversions or its judgments are connected with or affected by its pleasures and pains, then indeed the question with what bodily conditions its pleasures and pains are connected is part of the problem that interests the biologist—viz. what the conditions are under which the species can continue. But in that case the biologist must not claim that all the conditons of life and reproduction can be found in what happens in the body. Pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, purposes are not events that happen in the body. If they are the mere “apparence or sense” of what happens there, and alone determines survival or extinction, then what happens there to determine survival might, for all we can see, equally appear as pain or pleasure. (shrink)

Further, we come here to what for the purpose of our present argument is the most important consideration of all, viz. that if we could show that there were two kinds of neural or physiological processess, occurring respectively on all occasions of pleasure and pain, the fact would be valueless for proving that life must be predominantly pleasant. It is perhaps intelligible that to succeed or fail in purposive activity should bring respectively contentment and discontent rather than vice-versa; but that (...) of two kinds of neural or physiological process, one should be accompanied by pleasure and the other by pain, is no more intelligible than if the connection were reversed. If the behaviour of any creature is affected by desires and aversions, by judgments, by feelings: if its desires and aversions or its judgments are connected with or affected by its pleasures and pains, then indeed the question with what bodily conditions its pleasures and pains are connected is part of the problem that interests the biologist—viz. what the conditions are under which the species can continue. But in that case the biologist must not claim that all the conditons of life and reproduction can be found in what happens in the body. Pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, purposes are not events that happen in the body. If they are the mere “apparence or sense” of what happens there, and alone determines survival or extinction, then what happens there to determine survival might, for all we can see, equally appear as pain or pleasure. (shrink)

Almost all the existing modern systems of Ethics deal with formal definitions, and at bottom repeat more or less the same thing about them in slightly different words. In this work these are a side issue, and therefore are treated briefly. Their treatment in Section I is based upon the author's theoretical works the Theory of Order and the Theory of Reality, but will be intelligible to those who are not acquainted with those works. The chief concern is moral teaching (...) - that is, the practical element. (shrink)

Nicolai Hartmann, in an interesting discussion of Aristotle’s account of moral virtue, has called attention to the difference between the contrariety of opposed vices and the contrast of certain virtues. The äκρa or extremes, somewhere between which Aristotle thought that any morally virtuous disposition must lie, are not conciliable. The same man cannot combine or reconcile, in the same action, cowardice and bravery, intemperance and insensibility, stinginess and thriftlessness, passion and lack of spirit. These are pairs of contraries, between which (...) a virtue lies; but the virtue is not a synthesis of the extremes in a pair. (shrink)